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“JUUUUSSST A BIT OUTSIDE”: A LOOK AT WHETHER MLB
OWNERS CAN JUSTIFY PAYING MINOR LEAGUERS
BELOW MINIMUM WAGE WITHOUT
VIOLATING THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The North American sports industry has become a heavy
weight in the revenue world, and this industry appears to be getting
stronger.1  In 2013, the National Football League (“NFL”) and Ma-
jor League Baseball (“MLB”) alone accounted for $17 billion in
combined revenues.2  Even minor league systems, such as the
MLB’s Minor League Baseball (“MiLB”), have yielded impressive
results.3  In order to maintain these revenues, professional sports
teams require employees in a variety of different jobs.4  The players
competing on the field at the highest level are paid very well.5
However, the majority of teams’ employees, those who play in a
1. See Curtis Eichelberger, Sports Revenue to Reach $67.7 Billion by 2017, PwC
Report Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-11-13/sports-revenue-to-reach-67-7-billion-by-2017-pwc-report-says.html
(projecting that between ticket receipts, media rights, sponsorship and merchan-
dise purchases among professional leagues, college level, minor league, and some
individual sports properties, North American sports industry’s annual revenue will
grow to $67.7 billion by 2017).
2. See Monte Burke, How the National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in
Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25-billion-
in-annual-revenues/ (discussing how NFL’s estimated $9 billion revenue in 2013
season maintains NFL’s status as “most lucrative in the world.”); Selig Says MLB
Revenue Could Top $9 Billion, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:23 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/03/28/selig-says-mlb-revenue-could-top-9-
billion/7022245/ (stating that MLB’s annual revenues “reached $8 billion for the
first time in 2013, up from less than $2 billion when Selig became acting commis-
sioner in 1992”).
3. See Chris Smith, How Billionaires Like Warren Buffet Profit From Minor-League
Baseball Ownership, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jun. 12, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://sports.yahoo
.com/news/how-billionaires-like-warren-buffett-profit-from-minor-league-baseball-
ownership.html (reporting that “top 20 most valuable [MiLB] teams are worth an
average $22 million, with average revenue of $11 million”).
4. See MLB Jobs and MLB Related Sports Jobs, WORKINSPORTS.COM, http://www
.workinsports.com/mlb-jobs.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (noting that “each
[MLB] team employs an average of 150-200 full time employees” in numerous
capacities).
5. See MLB Average Salary Up 5.4% to $3.39 Million, ESPN (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:01
PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10158314/mlb-average-salary-54-per-
cent-339-million (reporting that average MLB player made $3.39 million in 2013).
(727)
1
Stanton: "Juuuussst A Bit Outside": A Look at Whether MLB Owners Can Justi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 196 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 196 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 2  8-JUL-15 10:46
728 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 727
MLB team’s minor league system or are not players at all, receive
drastically less compensation.6
In response to being underpaid, many employees of large
sports organizations have filed suits against their employers alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).7  The FLSA
ensures that employers grant certain rights to employees of compa-
nies or businesses involved in interstate commerce.8  Among many
other functions, it establishes the minimum wage in the United
States.9  It also mandates who an “employee” is, what records an
employer must keep, and what type of employee is exempt from the
rule.10  Over the past twenty years federal courts have seen a signifi-
6. See Adam Rubin, MLB Owners Voted to Allow Teams to Cut Pensions of Non-
Players, ESPN  (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/104
44699/mlb-owners-voted-allow-teams-cut-pensions-non-players (discussing how
many MLB employees outside of players make very modest amount and MLB own-
ers recently voted to allow teams to cut pension plans for non-players).  One re-
porter noted the following: “The retirement plans of any baseball employee not
wearing a big league uniform may be affected by the decision [to cut pension
plans], including secretaries, scouts, front-office executives, and minor league
staff.” See id. (explaining that owners voted to cut pensions for non-players “de-
spite earning more than $8 billion in revenue in 2013”).  This change would signif-
icantly affect a large portion of employees in baseball because many “personnel,
particularly at the minor league level and in amateur scouting, make less than
$40,000 a year and rely on pensions in retirement.” See id. (discussing implications
for most employees’ financial stability). See also Complaint para. 98, Senne v. Of-
fice of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14CV00608, 2014 WL 545501 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 2014), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/cdn.orrick.com/files/Senne-v-
MLB.pdf [hereinafter Complaint Senne] (listing small salaries earned by players at
each minor league level).
7. See Aimee Picchi, Will the Raiders’ $1.25M Settlement Fix Cheerleading?, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-the-raiders-
settlement-fix-cheerleading/ (considering effects of Oakland Raiders’ decision to
settle lawsuit by team’s cheerleaders alleging FLSA violations); see also Liger v. New
Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd., 565 F. Supp. 2d 680, 689 (E.D. La. 2008) (holding that
New Orleans Hornets were subject to FLSA in suit brought by former ticket sales
and fan relations employees).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2011) (declaring that Congress has power to regulate any
and all labor conditions related to interstate commerce that are detrimental to
“health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers”).  The FLSA was passed in
1938 as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Second New Deal” legislation
and sought to combat the deplorable conditions of the nation during the Great
Depression. See generally Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maxi-
mum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/flsa1938.htm (stating that FLSA for
first time banned oppressive child labor, set minimum hourly wage in country at
25 cents, and maximum workweek at 44 hours).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2011) (establishing current minimum wage
in United States at $7.25 per hour).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2011) (defining “employee” as “any individual em-
ployed by an employer”); 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2011) (stating that all employers
must keep and maintain records of employee wages, hours, and conditions of work
environment); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2011) (stating that employees working for
2
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cant increase in the amount of suits filed alleging FLSA wage viola-
tions per year.11  While many different sports organizations have
been the target of these suits, the MLB, in particular, has been a
recurring defendant.12  The MLB has handled these challenges
without much trouble, although Senne v. Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball, an ongoing class action suit filed in February 2014, could
pose substantial problems for MLB owners.13
In Senne, former minor league baseball players sued the MLB
asserting FLSA violations, specifically, that the players were paid
well below minimum wage and did not receive proper overtime
pay.14  The case raises a number of difficult legal questions with
broad implications for MLB and professional sports organiza-
tions.15  The MLB will likely argue that baseball is not considered a
job, and thus, does not fall under the purview of the FLSA.16  If that
argument fails and the court classifies baseball as a job, the MLB
will likely attempt to point to certain exemptions in the rule.17  Re-
gardless of the arguments made and the defenses raised, a win for
amusement or recreational establishments not operating for at least seven months
of calendar year are not subject to FLSA).
11. See Kevin P. McGowan, FLSA Lawsuits Hit Record High in 2012, Continuing
Recent Trend of Sharp Growth, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.bna
.com/flsa-lawsuits-hit-n12884911026/ (describing statistics showing significant in-
crease in number of FLSA suits filed in federal court from 1993, when 1,457 were
filed, to 2012 when record-high 7,064 were filed); see also Richard L. Alfred, FLSA
Suits Hit New Record High in 2013, Cases Spike Above 7,700, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (May
9, 2013), http://www.seyfarth.com/news/2279 (discussing statistics showing that
record-high 7,764 FLSA suits were filed from May 2012 to May 2013).
12. For a further discussion of the recent FLSA suits filed against Major
League Baseball, see sources cited infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Complaint Senne, supra note 6 (presenting claims of minor
league baseball players alleging various FLSA violations against MLB); see also Sec-
ond Amended Complaint, Senne v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No.
3:14CV00608, 2014 WL 2619616 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2014), available at http://www
.scribd.com/doc/224796744/Senne-v-MLB-2d-Amended-Complaint [hereinafter
Second Amended Complaint Senne] (amending complaint since filing in February
to include at least one former minor leaguer from each MLB team, thus targeting
all 30 MLB clubs).
14. See Complaint Senne, supra note 6, para. 9 (claiming that MLB violates
FLSA minimum wage and overtime requirements as well as FLSA recordkeeping
requirements).
15. See Tony Dokoupil, Major League Baseball’s ‘Working Poor’: Minor Leaguers
Sue Over Pay, NBC NEWS (July 15, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/sports/major-league-baseballs-working-poor-minor-leaguers-sue-over-pay-
n156051 (noting that judge or jury will have to determine if job of professional
baseball player is covered under FLSA).
16. See id. (observing that despite MLB’s refusal to comment it will likely ar-
gue baseball is exempt from FLSA because it is seasonal amusement).
17. See Michael McCann, In Lawsuit Minor Leaguers Charge They Are Members of
‘Working Poor’, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.si.com/mlb/
2014/02/12/minor-league-baseball-players-lawsuit (suggesting that MLB will make
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the minor leaguers in this case could significantly alter the land-
scape of professional sports.18
This Comment discusses the likelihood that the minor leaguers
will prevail in their action by analyzing court precedent in relation
to baseball and considers what legal implications such a ruling
would have in baseball and other sports.19  Section II summarizes
the history of professional baseball’s relationship with the law, start-
ing with its antitrust.20  Next, Section II discusses the efforts players
made to unionize and how they achieved their first Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement (“CBA”).21  Further, Section II addresses the
FLSA suits filed against the MLB prior to Senne.22  Section III ana-
lyzes Senne and explores the underlying background, as well as the
factual allegations and legal claims brought by the minor leagu-
ers.23  Following an evaluation of the facts in the suit, Section IV
proceeds in three parts.  First, it discusses the likelihood of a win for
the minor leaguers.24  Second, it assumes arguendo that the court
rules in favor of the minor leaguers and considers the effects of
such a result.25  Third, it contemplates the implications of such a
decision for college athletics in light of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’s (“NLRB”) decision regarding Northwestern Foot-
ball.26  Finally, Section V concludes with an assurance that this
decision will motivate change which will cure some of the difficul-
ties minor league players face in their quest to reach the “big
“professional employee” argument which excludes those who perform original or
unique work from coverage under FLSA).
18. See Dokoupil, supra note 15 (acknowledging that virtually every player in
MLB has played in Minor League and more than 6,000 current and recent minor
leaguers could be affected by case).
19. For a further discussion of possible outcomes and ramifications of the
case, see sources cited infra notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of MLB’s antitrust exemption, see sources cited
infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of unionization in baseball and the first collective
bargaining agreement, see infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of prior FLSA suits against the MLB, see infra
notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
23. For more background on the Senne lawsuit, see infra notes 93-66 and ac-
companying text.
24. For a further discussion on likely outcomes, see infra notes 167-82 and
accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the effects a win for minor leaguers would have
on baseball and the rest of the sports world, see infra notes 183-96 and accompany-
ing text.
26. For a more detailed discussion on the impact on college athletics and the
Northwestern Football issue, see sources cited infra notes 185-90 and accompany-
ing text.
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leagues,” while maintaining the beauty of the journey and the ulti-
mate satisfaction in achieving their goal.27
II. BASEBALL IN THE COURTS: HISTORY OF COURT PRECEDENT
A. The Antitrust Exemption
Baseball has been considered an anomaly under the law since
1922, when the Supreme Court first established that professional
baseball is exempt from antitrust law.28  The history of the antitrust
exemption dates back to the late nineteenth century when team
owners successfully curtailed player mobility through the institution
of a reserve clause in players’ contracts.29  Once a team “reserved” a
player, he could not sign with another team and his only option was
to re-sign with his own team.30  Such a restraint not only limited
players in their freedom to choose where they wanted to play, but
also severely depressed their ability to earn higher salaries because
teams could not compete for their services.31  Shortly after the es-
27. For a further discussion on likelihood for positive change, see infra notes
196-201 and accompanying text.
28. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (upholding baseball antitrust
exemption citing absence of remedial legislation enacted by Congress).  In Flood,
the Court refused to stray from its precedent established in Federal Baseball Club
v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953), openly admitting that these decisions granted baseball an exemp-
tion from antitrust law.  The Court further noted that this exemption is, “in a very
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly,” and that “Federal Baseball and Toolson
have become an aberration confined to baseball.” See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (em-
phasis added) (acknowledging that baseball is only sport exempt from antitrust law
while “football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf” are still sub-
ject to antitrust law).
29. See generally Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The
Failure of the Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (1997), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1236&con
text=mslj (discussing how owners responded to player mobility by establishing re-
serve clause in players’ contracts that permanently bound them to their original
team).  In 1903, out of fear that players would go from one team to another seek-
ing offers—effectively driving up the cost of their services, the National League
and American League came together to form the MLB under the condition that
both Leagues would use reserve clauses so that increased player costs could not
jeopardize owners’ financial ability to pay their players. See generally ROGER I.
ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 64-69 (1998) (outlining truce be-
tween warring leagues).
30. See Moorad, supra note 29, at 56-57 (describing how players were doomed
to play for team their entire career “absent retirement or the team’s decision to
trade or cut them”).
31. See id. at 55-57 (discussing overall restrictions by reserve clause system on
players).  Today, the ability of teams to compete for players’ services through a
bidding process has resulted in enormous, multi-million dollar deals. See, e.g.,  Al-
bert Pujols Signs with Los Angeles Angels, Outbidding Marlins and Cardinals, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/albert-pujols-signs-
with-los-angeles-angels-outbidding-marlins-and-cardinals/2011/12/08/gIQAYI9u
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tablishment of the reserve clause the players began to see how dis-
advantaged they were and, for years, they unsuccessfully challenged
the owners.32
The first notable challenge to the owners’ power came in the
Supreme Court case of Federal Baseball Club v. National League.33  In
Federal Baseball, owners of the rival Federal Baseball Club League
brought suit against the National League, known today as the MLB,
alleging that National League owners conspired to destroy the Fed-
eral Baseball League and monopolize baseball itself.34  In a unani-
mous decision, the Court held that even though teams were located
in different states, did business with one another, and traveled
across state lines to play one another, baseball was not in the busi-
ness of interstate commerce.35  Therefore, baseball was exempt
from the Sherman Act—the federal antitrust law.36
The next challenge to the owners’ stranglehold on baseball
came in the Supreme Court case Toolson v. New York Yankees in
1953.37  George Earl Toolson, a pitcher in the New York Yankees
fO_story.html (reporting that Angels outbid other teams to sign 32-year-old peren-
nial All-Star Albert Pujols to 10-year deal worth $250 million).
32. See Ed Edmonds, At the Brink of Free Agency: Creating the Foundation of the
Messersmith-McNally Decision – 1968-1975, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 571 (2010) (noting
that for 75 years owners successfully defended challenges to reserve clause and
limited player mobility).
33. See Federal Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 201 (1922) (re-
counting suit brought by rival league against National League alleging antitrust
violations).
34. See id. (discussing allegations by former Federal League owner of Balti-
more Terrapins that National League violated antitrust law by buying out most
Federal League teams but not his).
35. See id. at 208-209 (“The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic],
which are purely state affairs . . . . [T]he fact that in order to give the exhibitions
the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay
for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the business.”).
36. See id. (holding that National League defendants “were not within the
Sherman Act” because business of baseball did not constitute interstate com-
merce); see also Moorad, supra note 29, at 59 (“The Court, in [Federal Baseball] . . .
held that baseball was not subject to federal antitrust laws because it was not an
activity involving interstate commerce.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2014) (prohibiting anti-
competitive behavior that restricts interstate trade or commerce, such as price-fix-
ing and monopolies).  The Court has noted that the purpose of the Sherman Act
“is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the
public from the failure of the market.  The law directs itself not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to
destroy competition itself.” See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,
458 (1993) (explaining that purpose of antitrust law is to protect competition
which in turn protects public from being taken advantage of by companies that
may collude with one another to raise prices).
37. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (challenging MLB’s
antitrust exemption as well as challenging reserve clause for first time).
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minor league system, brought an antitrust suit against the Yankees
alleging that the team’s reserve clause constituted an unfair re-
straint of trade.38  Ultimately, the challenge failed and the court
affirmed Federal Baseball.39  The court reasoned that because Con-
gress had not changed the law since Federal Baseball, baseball re-
mained exempt from antitrust law and thus the reserve clause was
valid.40
The players finally reclaimed some power following Flood v.
Kuhn,41 a heavily criticized 1972 Supreme Court case.42  Curt Flood
was a star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals.43  During his time
in St. Louis, Flood won seven Gold Glove Awards, two World Series
38. See id. at 362-63 (Burton, J., dissenting) (recounting that plaintiff profes-
sional baseball players alleged they “[had] been damaged by enforcement of the
standard ‘reserve clause’ in their contracts,” and that teams violated Sherman Act
by organizing as illegal monopoly and engaging in “unreasonable restraints of
trade”).  Following the dissolution of his minor league team, Toolson was demoted
to a lower level minor league team within Yankees’ farm system and refused to
show up because he felt he was good enough to play in MLB yet was unable to
negotiate with other teams due to the reserve clause, effectively binding him to the
talent-rich Yankees with no chance to make their MLB roster. See generally G. RICH-
ARD MCKELVEY, FOR IT’S ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR STRIKES YOU’RE OUT AT THE OWN-
ERS’ BALL GAME: PLAYERS VERSUS MANAGEMENT IN BASEBALL? 52 (2001) (discussing
Toolson’s belief that he was being denied opportunity to play in majors due to
depth of Yankees’ farm system).
39. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (upholding antitrust exemption established in
Federal Baseball).
40. See id. (“Congress has had [Federal Baseball] under consideration but has
not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospec-
tive effect.”).  Without examination of the underlying factual allegations, the Tool-
son Court affirmed the lower courts’ holdings “on the authority of Federal
Baseball . . . so far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of
including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”
See id. (emphasis added) (reaffirming that professional baseball is not subject to
federal antitrust laws).
41. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
42. See generally Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 169 (1994) (noting harsh criticism decision received in
professional sports law field as well as ridicule Justice Blackmun received for his
writing of opinion).  Justice Blackmun dedicates Part I of the opinion to a lengthy,
colorful account of the game’s history, its origins, and its famous players. See id. at
172 (acknowledging that many were aware of Justice Blackmun’s passion for base-
ball and referred to him as “Minnesota Twin” due to his love for his hometown
team).  For example, Justice Blackmun wrote about players who have “sparked the
diamond and its environs and that have provided tinder for recaptured thrills . . .
Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Tris Speaker, Walter Johnson, Henry Chadwick, Eddie Col-
lins . . . Moe Berg, Rabbit Maranville, Jimmie Foxx, Lefty Grove. The list seems
endless.” See Flood, 407 U.S. at 262-63 (indicating his love for baseball by listing 83
players names in opening of majority opinion).
43. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 264 (explaining that flood played with Cardinals
from 1958-1969).
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Championships, and was captain of the team.44  After a trade was
announced that would send him to the Philadelphia Phillies, Flood
refused to go.45  He then sought injunctive relief against the reserve
clause.46  The Court yet again upheld the decisions of Federal Base-
ball and Toolson, noting the danger involved by overturning court
precedent, but acknowledged for the first time that baseball is in
fact engaged in interstate commerce.47
Flood paved the way for the monumental Seitz decision in 1975,
in which an arbitrator ruled that MLB players became free agents
after playing one year for their team without a contract.48  This en-
ded the reign of the reserve clause in baseball.49  From there, the
Major League Baseball Player’s Association (“MLBPA”) began to
grow into what is now considered the strongest union in all of
sports.50
44. See Curt Flood Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www
.baseball-reference.com/players/f/floodcu01.shtml?redir (last visited Mar. 27,
2015) (providing Curt Flood’s professional baseball statistics).
45. See Gary Norris Gray, Curt Flood a Man With a Cause, BLACK ATHLETE
SPORTS NETWORK, http://blackathlete.net/2011/09/curt-flood-a-man-with-a-
cause/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2011) (explaining that Flood did not want to go to
Philadelphia due to perception of racist fans).
46. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66 (explaining that Flood initiated antitrust law-
suit seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief and treble damages”).
47. See id. at 282 (concluding that professional baseball is still exempt from
antitrust law but acknowledging that “[it] is a business and it is engaged in inter-
state commerce”).
48. See Roger I. Abrams, Arbitrator Seitz Sets the Players Free, SOCIETY FOR AMERI-
CAN BASEBALL RESEARCH (2009), http://sabr.org/research/arbitrator-seitz-sets-
players-free (stating that decision was “most important labor arbitration decision of
all time”).  The language of the reserve clause allowed for a team to renew a con-
tract for a period of one year following the end of a signed contract. See id. (noting
that clause had always been read to mean team could simply resign same player
year after year).  The Major League Baseball Player’s Association (“MLBPA”) ar-
gued that the clause meant a contract could be renewed “only once,” while the
owners interpreted the clause as meaning a contract could be renewed in
perpetuity. See id. (recounting disagreement leading to need for neutral arbitrator
to settle dispute).  Arbitrator Peter Seitz decided in favor of the MLBPA. See id.
(summarizing decision that declared players who filed grievances to be deemed
first ever free agents).
49. See id. (explaining how “century-old personnel system [was] demolished
by Arbitrator Seitz”).
50. See Barry Svrluga, Tony Clark Named Executive Director of Major League Base-
ball Players Association, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/sports/nationals/tony-clark-named-executive-director-of-major-league-base-
ball-players-association/2013/12/03/e876855a-5c66-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story
.html (noting that MLBPA is widely considered “strongest players’ union in profes-
sional sports”).
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B. The MLBPA and CBA51
When antitrust challenges continuously failed, players looked
to other legal remedies to counteract the MLB and its owners’
power.52  The first attempt to form a players union was in 1885.53
Throughout the next seventy years, players attempted to unionize
and were quickly shut down.54  In 1954, a union was established in
the form of the MLBPA.55  The union, however, did not begin mak-
ing significant gains until several years later.56
With the hiring of Marvin Miller as the head of the MLBPA in
1966, the union started to see results.57  In 1967, the MLBPA took a
great step forward when Miller guaranteed players substantial bene-
fits.58  The following year the MLBPA entered into the first CBA in
professional sports history.59  The 1968 CBA established League-
wide minimum salaries, pension payments, and a grievance pro-
cess.60  The agreement raised the minimum salary in baseball to
$10,000, and players were given the right to arbitration to settle
grievances with the owners.61
51. See BLS Information, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/
bls/glossary.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (defining collective bargaining as
“method whereby representatives of employees (unions) and employers negotiate
the conditions of employment, normally resulting in a written contract [CBA]
setting forth the wages, hours, and other conditions to be observed for a stipulated
period”).
52. See Moorad, supra note 29, at 62-64 (summarizing history of players’
unionization efforts throughout 20th century).
53. See id. at 62 (discussing New York Giants’ player John Montgomery Ward’s
efforts to start Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players).
54. See id. (noting efforts by players in 1914 and 1946, which were rapidly
squashed by MLB team owners).
55. See id. at 62-63 (highlighting fact that first President of MLBPA, Judge
Robert Cannon, had strong ties with owners and had never played baseball
professionally).
56. See id. (indicating initial trouble in gaining any traction with MLBPA be-
cause Judge Robert Cannon’s connections with owners delayed progress for more
than 10 years).
57. See id. at 63 (noting Miller’s success in negotiating pension plans for play-
ers).  Prior to his role with the MLBPA, Marvin Miller worked with the United
States Steelworkers of America, where he was largely considered an expert econo-
mist. See MLBPA Info, History of Major League Baseball Players Association, MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2015) (describing Miller’s knowledge of unions and ability to “mold
the players into a bona fide labor union”).
58. See Moorad, supra note 29, at 63 (finding Miller was able to double play-
ers’ benefits).
59. See id. (discussing novelty of CBA at time and lack of one in all other
professional sports).
60. See id. at 63-64 (outlining general provisions of 1968 CBA).
61. See MLBPA Info, supra note 57 (citing raise from $6,000 which minimum
salary had been fixed at for more than two decades).  Miller saw the right to arbi-
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In 1972, the MLBPA flexed its newfound muscles by staging a
strike.62  The strike took the League by surprise and delayed the
start of the regular season.63  This stoppage in work led to a new
CBA that further cemented the players’ right to an arbitration pro-
cess for settling grievances and solidified the absolute power of an
arbitrator’s decision.64
The right to an arbitration process set the table for the critical
Seitz decision.65  Given the lack of success the players had in the
courts, their ability to settle grievances through a neutral arbitrator
was critical to shifting the balance of power.66  Thus, when Arbitra-
tor Seitz declared the aggrieved players were free agents, it was now
the MLB who sought the court’s help in challenging a decision.67
The MLB suffered its first real loss in the courts when the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling, holding that the reserve
clause issue must be settled through collective bargaining.68  There-
fore, in 1976, the two sides reached an agreement, ending the re-
serve clause system and instituting free agency.69  Under the new
system, a player was eligible to become a free agent after six years of
service time.70
tration as crucial to developing the foundation for the MLBPA’s future negotia-
tions. See id. (noting arbitration process would pave way for future gains).  Under
arbitration, when the players have a grievance with the owners, an independent
arbitrator is brought in to listen to both sides and settle the dispute as opposed to
taking the issue to court. See MLBPA Info, Frequently Asked Questions, MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp#cba (last visited
Apr. 15, 2015) (providing answers to common questions regarding workings of
MLBPA).
62. See Moorad, supra note 29, at 64 (discussing significance of striking for
future labor relations).
63. See id. (“This was the first league-wide work stoppage in baseball history.”).
64. See id. (reiterating importance of grievance process considering lack of
success in courts).
65. See Abrams, supra note 48 (discussing importance of Seitz’s role as inde-
pendent arbitrator as opposed to bringing case to court to be decided).
66. See id. (reiterating successful avenue in which to challenge reserve clause).
67. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting owners’ claim that, under CBA, reserve system was not subject to
arbitration).
68. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615, 632-34 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding CBA clearly called for issue of
reserve system to be settled by arbitrator and owners were forced to collectively
bargain over issue with players).
69. See Moorad, supra note 29, at 66 (explaining players were free from bind-
ing perpetual contracts).
70. See id. (highlighting importance of new player mobility freedoms).  “Ser-
vice time” is related to how long a player has played in the League, and many
times, teams call up players to their big League rosters in a very strategic way so as
to control them for as long as they can. See Zachary Levine, How MLB Service Time
10
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Since these early years, through collective bargaining and the
grievance process, the MLBPA has enjoyed considerable success
and is considered one of the best unions among all labor organiza-
tions.71  Although, despite being affected by conditions of the CBA,
minor leaguers are not represented by the MLBPA.72  As explored
in Senne, the MLB’s exploitation of minor leaguers as a bargaining
chip in CBA negotiations has become a serious problem.73
C. Recent FLSA Challenges Against the MLB
Another, more recent wave of challenges against the MLB have
included both federal and state wage law violations.74  Most re-
cently, in Chen v. Major League Baseball, an individual who worked as
a volunteer for an All-Star Weekend event sued the MLB demand-
ing compensation.75  The volunteer claimed that his work at MLB’s
FanFest in New York City qualified him as an employee under the
FLSA.76  The federal court quickly dismissed his claim.77  In sup-
port of its reasoning, the court held that the MLB was exempt from
FLSA in this circumstance because FanFest was an amusement es-
tablishment operating less than seven months a year.78  Although
this claim was trivial in nature, it is only one of what seems to be a
Dictates Top-Prospect Promotions, FOX SPORTS (Apr. 19, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www
.foxsports.com/mlb/story/how-mlb-service-time-dictates-top-prospect-promotions-
041914 (discussing intricacies of when, how, and why teams may delay bringing up
top-prospects in order to hold onto them for as long as possible).
71. See Svrluga, supra note 50 (noting MLBPA’s reputation as excellent
union).
72. For a further discussion of minor leaguers’ lack of representation, see in-
fra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
73. For a further discussion of MLB’s use of minor leaguers as bargaining
chips in collective bargaining negotiations, see infra notes 117-137 and accompany-
ing text.
74. For a detailed discussion of recent labor law litigation, see infra notes 81-
92 and accompanying text.
75. See Chen v. Major League Baseball, 6 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2014) (dismissing minimum wage claims brought by MLB volunteer).
76. See id. at 452-53 (claiming his work—stamping attendee’s wrists, handing
out paraphernalia, and directing attendees—made him employee under FLSA and
entitled to minimum wage).
77. See id. at 453 (holding that court would not address legal issue of em-
ployee status because claim could be dismissed on other grounds).
78. See id. at 454 (citing amusement or recreation exemption from FLSA).
Any employee who is employed by an amusement or recreational establishment is
exempt from minimum wage and maximum hour requirements if the establish-
ment “does not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year” or if
“during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of
such year were not more than 33 1/3 per centum of its average receipts for the
other six months of such year[.]” See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2011) (stating lan-
guage of mandate).
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growing trend of claims in labor law.79  Accordingly, this notion of
seasonal businesses has become a popular defense to such claims.80
Determining whether a business is seasonal in nature, which
would exempt it from FLSA regulation, has been an important, yet
unsettled, issue in baseball.81  In Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, the
maintenance staff working for the Cincinnati Reds sued the team
claiming they were not receiving proper overtime pay.82  In de-
fense, the Reds claimed that they did not have to pay overtime
under the standards set out in the FLSA because the franchise was
an amusement establishment operating less than seven months per
year.83  The lower court rejected this defense and held that the
team was a year-round business.84  On appeal, the Reds argued that
their method of accounting should be taken into consideration
when deciding whether or not their operations were seasonal.85
The appellate court disagreed, and held that the method of ac-
counting should not be taken into consideration.86  Thus, the ap-
pellate court upheld the lower court’s decision that the Cincinnati
Reds, who employed 120 employees year-round, were not a seasonal
organization and in turn subject to the FLSA.87
79. See Noel Tripp, Major League Baseball All-Star Weekend Volunteers Not Employ-
ees Under Fair Labor Standards Act, THE NAT’L L. REV.  (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www
.natlawreview.com/article/major-league-baseball-mlb-all-star-weekend-volunteers-
not-employees-under-fair-labor (noting popularity of claim among employees, es-
pecially unpaid interns seeking compensation).
80. See id. (warning businesses that recreation and amusement exemption
does not apply to all).
81. See Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding
Cincinnati Reds were not seasonal establishment under FLSA). But see Jeffery v.
Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding minor league team Sara-
sota White Sox were seasonal establishment under FLSA).
82. See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 829-30 (claiming Reds violated 29 U.S.C. § 207
when they refused to pay staff time plus one-half for hours worked exceeding 40
hours per week).
83. See id. at 829 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)) (exempting from FLSA amuse-
ment or recreational establishments that operate less than seven months per year).
84. See Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 68 F.3d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting
that team employed 120 employees year-round).
85. See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 830 (arguing if court looked at accounting
method franchise would fit exemption condition).  An employer is exempt from
the FLSA if its average receipts for any six months of the preceding year were not
more than one-third of the total amount of its average receipts for the other six
months of that same year. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2011) (citing language of
FLSA).
86. See Bridewell, 155 F.3d at 830-31 (holding money received during season as
well as that in off-season should be used in determination of whether organization
falls within FLSA exemption).
87. See id. at 830-32 (holding Reds franchise does not qualify for the exemp-
tion from the FLSA under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)).
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In contrast, the court in Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox came to a
different conclusion.88  Similar to the maintenance staff in Bridewell,
a grounds keeper for a minor league baseball team sued the team
for unpaid overtime under the FLSA.89  The Eleventh Circuit de-
nied the claim on grounds that the team was exempt from FLSA.90
The court held that because the team’s season was only five months
long, they did not have to pay employees overtime regardless of
whether or not plaintiff worked for the team in the off-season.91
Thus, professional baseball’s standing under the FLSA is currently
unsettled.92
III. WHERE WE ARE TODAY: SENNE V. OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL
A. The Current Minor League System
Every MLB team has an extensive farm system with affiliated
teams in every level of Minor League Baseball.93  There are six
levels of minor league baseball: Triple-A, Double-A, A Advanced, A,
Short-Season A, and Rookie; therefore, at a minimum, all thirty
teams employ six teams-worth of players.94  Major League Baseball
Rules allocate how many players are allowed on a roster at each
level, with major league teams permitted to reserve forty players to
their own rosters.95  Thus, because every team has at least six minor
88. Compare id. (holding Cincinnati Reds were not a seasonal organization),
with Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding Sarasota
White Sox were a seasonal organization).
89. See Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 592-93 (alleging plaintiff received same salary each
week regardless of number of hours over forty he worked per week).
90. See id. at 594-97 (stressing that focus under FLSA § 213(a)(3) is on dura-
tion of team’s recreational-related operations, as opposed to employment of some
employees on year-round basis).
91. See id. at 596 (holding it is time of revenue-producing operation of team
as professional sports franchise during 5 month season which affords it protection
of exemption).
92. For a discussion of inconsistencies in the courts on baseball’s standing
under FLSA, see supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
93. See Teams by Affiliations, MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/milb/info/affil-
iations.jsp (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (listing all thirty MLB teams and their minor
league affiliates).
94. See id. (noting most teams retain between 7-9 teams, while Yankees retain
10 teams).
95. See MLB Official Info, MLB Miscellany: Rules, Regulations and Statistics, MLB
.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/about_mlb/rules_regulations.jsp
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (noting clubs can reserve maximum 40 players on roster
but from Opening Day – August 31 only 25 players can be on active roster).
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league affiliates, each major league team pays the salaries of ap-
proximately two hundred players.96
Despite major league teams paying both the players and
coaches’ salaries of their minor league affiliates, the majority of mi-
nor league teams are independently owned.97  On the whole, minor
league teams have done very well for themselves, with the most valu-
able franchises worth millions of dollars.98  While minor league
owners focus on the business side of their team (i.e., selling tickets
and managing stadiums), major league teams make all player devel-
opment decisions and control player mobility.99  Under this rela-
tionship, major league teams are able to cultivate their product at a
cheap price while ownership of minor league franchises reap the
benefits of the ability to give fans the opportunity to watch good,
young, hardworking talent each night.100  Looking at the revenues
professional baseball has brought in, both at the major and minor
league level, it appears everyone wins under the current system;101
96. See Teams by Affiliations, supra note 93 (listing each minor league affiliate
and their corresponding rosters).  An estimated 83% of the players in a MLB
team’s system will never play in the major league. See Jordan Mader, Baseball’s Mi-
nor League Labor Problem, SB NATION: BREW CREW BALL (Mar. 27, 2014, 4:02 PM),
http://www.brewcrewball.com/2014/3/27/5551758/baseballs-minor-league-la-
bor-problem (stating it is very important to MLB owners to be able to unilaterally
decide how much to pay these players that will never play for them).
97. See Chris Smith, Minor League Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Jul.
17, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/07/17/minor-
league-baseballs-most-valuable-teams/ (noting wealthy individuals comprise major-
ity of team owners with many having multiple ownership with stakes in numerous
teams across different leagues).
98. See id. (estimating top 20 most valuable franchises in all of minor leagues
were worth about $28 million, as of 2013).
99. See Player Development Contracts, MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/con-
tent/page.jsp?ymd=20140911&content_id=94226140&fext=.jsp&sid=&vkey=news
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (discussing affiliation between MLB team and owner-
ship of minor league franchise established by Player Development Contract
(“PDC”)).  The PDC allocates the duties of each party: owners of minor league
franchises are in charge of “assembling a front office and staff to manage all busi-
ness aspects, including game day activities such as ticket sales, promotions, broad-
casting[,]” while MLB team’s responsibilities are all player development related,
such as hiring a coaching staff and assigning players to teams within their farm
system. See id. (detailing duties of all party).
100. See Smith, supra note 97 (highlighting potential to profit in minor league
ownership).  The Dayton Dragons, Cincinnati Red’s Single-A affiliate, hold the
longest professional sports record for consecutive sellouts, with the streak reaching
1,000 consecutive games in May 2014. See Dragons Sell-Out Streak Reaches 1,000, DAY-
TON DRAGONS (May 10, 2014, 10:58 PM), http://www.milb.com/news/article.jsp?
ymd=20140510&content_id=75062440&fext=.jsp&vkey=news_t459&sid=t459 (not-
ing Dragons passed former record holder NBA’s Portland Trailblazers who had
814 consecutive sellouts).
101. For a further discussion on profitability of both major league and minor
league baseball franchises, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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although, as former minor leaguer Garret Broshuis brought to the
country’s attention, not everyone is a winner.102
A romantic aura has always surrounded the long, arduous jour-
ney a player makes through the minor leagues to ultimately achiev-
ing his goal and making it to the “Big Show.”103  Struggling through
restless bus rides, sharing hotel beds, and playing for little money
has long been considered a rite of passage for minor leaguers who
hope to one day make the glamorous major leagues.104  However,
these aspects of the journey make the minor leaguer’s road to the
major leagues challenging both on and off the field.105  The system
weeds out those who do not have the requisite combination of tal-
ent and determination to secure a spot on a major league roster.106
Yet, according to the plaintiffs in Senne, the hardships attendant to
this journey have risen to a level of illegality considering the hours
they work in comparison to the pay they receive.107
B. Exploitation of Minor League Throughout History of
Collective Bargaining
As discussed in Section II, through collective bargaining major
league players finally reclaimed some power from the owners.108
Collective bargaining is the process through which a union, repre-
senting a class of employees, negotiates a contract with an employer
102. See Garret Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collective
Bargaining on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51 (2012)
(detailing serious issues with current system and minor league player treatment).
Garret Broshuis is a former minor league baseball player who, after writing the
above-mentioned law review article in 2012, became the original plaintiff in Senne
and has continued to be the leading advocate for minor leaguers. See generally
Complaint Senne, supra note 6  (presenting to nation alleged failings of current
baseball system).
103. See THE ROOKIE (Walt Disney Pictures 2002) (dramatizing life of long-
time minor league player who achieves his ultimate goal when called up to pitch in
majors at age thirty-five).
104. See Josh Leventhal, Minor League Players Sue for Better Salaries, BASEBALL
AMERICA  (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.baseballamerica.com/minors/players-sue-
for-better-salaries/ (discussing Senne suit and traditional notions of minor league
life).
105. See id. (noting financial hardship has always been part of route to major
leagues).
106. See id. (concluding if player is good enough he will be in majors making
millions in little time, but if he is not, then he must get another job or suffer
financial hardship).
107. See generally Complaint, Senne, supra note 6 (alleging federal wage viola-
tions).  The plaintiffs refer to the MLB throughout the complaint as a “cartel” that
“has a long, infamous history of labor exploitation.” See also id. para. 3 (citing
introduction of complaint).
108. For a further discussion on the success the MLB has had with collective
bargaining, see sources cited supra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
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to determine terms of employment.109  As is the case in any negotia-
tion, both parties make concessions or compromises in order to
reach an agreement.110  Thus, while the MLBPA garnered some
success in ensuring exemplary working conditions for major league
players, it made concessions along the way.111  Many of these con-
cessions came at the cost of minor league players’ rights.112
This issue of the bargaining process—concessions detrimental
to minor leaguers while beneficial for major leaguers—deservedly
caused unrest among minor leaguers, because they are not repre-
sented by the MLBPA.113  A look at the CBAs since the 1960’s ex-
poses the effects of collective bargaining on minor leaguers.114  The
first CBA in 1968 contained critical language establishing the
MLBPA’s representation of only major league players.115  Despite
broadly worded language that the MLBPA “contracts for and on
behalf of . . . individuals who may become major league baseball
players,” courts narrowly read this clause to exclude minor league
players.116
109. See AFL-CIO, Collective Bargaining, AM. FED’N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF IN-
DUS. ORGS., http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/Collective-Bargaining
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (suggesting terms of employment usually relate to pay,
benefits, hours, leave, job health and safety policies).
110. See Negotiate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“to bring about
by discussion or bargaining”); Negotiate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negotiate (last visited Apr. 15,
2015) (defining negotiate as “to arrange for or bring about through conference,
discussion, or compromise”).
111. See MLBPA Info, supra note 61 (stating $500,000 as minimum salary for
major leaguer in 2014).  On top of being very well paid, during road trips players
travel first-class in chartered flights, stay in the most luxurious hotels, and every
detail of their trip is taken care of for them. See Sean McAdam, First Class All the
Way, ESPN (June 12, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?id=20
82030 (detailing accommodations provided for MLB players on road trips).
112. For a further discussion on less than exemplary minor league working
conditions, see supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
113. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 73 (citing language in 1968 CBA clarify-
ing MLBPA’s representation of major league players solely).
114. See id. at 72-90 (tracing history of CBAs through past five decades and
detrimental effects to minor leaguers).
115. See id. at 73 (citing relevant portion of 1968 CBA that MLBPA “repre-
sents that it contracts for and on behalf of the major league baseball players and
individuals who may become major league baseball players during the term of this
Agreement).
116. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc.,
880 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (specifying MLBPA represents forty-person
rosters of each MLB team).  In Silverman, the MLBPA complained to the National
Labor Relations Board that the MLB Owners were not bargaining in good faith
and the NLRB in turn sought an injunction against the MLB in District Court. See
id. (granting–in opinion written by then junior trial judge, now Associate Supreme
Court Justice, Sonia Sotomayor–injunction against MLB after they unilaterally
16
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With no duty owed to minor leaguers’ interests, the MLBPA
has continually used minor league players as bargaining chips in
advancing the interests of major league players.117  This trend
started with the 1976 CBA.118  With the fall of the reserve clause,
the agreement addressed free agency for the first time.119  Under
this newfound free agency system, if a team signed a free agent away
from his former team, that team had to compensate the player’s
former team with a draft choice in the following year’s draft.120
This compensation clause, and the general use of negotiating over
matters affecting minor league players, set the stage for future deals
implicating minor league players’ rights.121
The 1981 Basic Agreement refined the compensation clause,
further cementing the free use of minor leaguers’ interests in nego-
tiating terms.122  The 1990 Agreement addressed payment of play-
ers under “split-contracts.”123  Under a split-contract, a minor
league player found his salary significantly increased regardless of
whether he ever made it back onto a major league roster.124  Thus,
not all negotiated decisions that affected minor league players were
changed wage conditions by abolishing both salary arbitration and anti-collusion
promise as well as prohibiting free agency).
117. For a discussion on MLBPA’s use of minor leaguers as a bargaining chip,
see infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
118. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 74 (noting although most of agreement
pertained to major league players—guaranteed first-class travel and first-class
meals—some provisions effected minor league players).
119. See Moorad, supra note 29 (discussing no more binding contracts in wake
of Seitz decision yet draft pick implications came with free agency).
120. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 75 (describing compensation clause in
which free agent’s new team would have to give free agent’s former team first or
second round pick in next draft).  If the team who acquired the free agent finished
in the first half of the overall league standings the year before, they had to com-
pensate the free agent’s former team with their own first round draft pick for the
upcoming draft. See id. (noting team who finished in bottom half of standings had
to give second round draft pick in upcoming draft).
121. See id. (stating precedent now set to bargain away amateur player’s rights
which would become commonplace during CBA negotiations).
122. See id. at 76 (describing system in which free agents were ranked so when
teams lost higher-level free agents they were compensated with certain draft picks).
123. See id. at 76-77 (defining split-contract as contract for players with former
major league experience who were demoted back down to minor leagues).
124. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 77 (noting if player played only one day
in major leagues his subsequent minor league salary was increased to at least
$26,500 under CBA).  This is a significant increase for only playing one day in the
major league considering the average minimum amount a minor leaguer made
annually in 2010 was $7,375. See id. at 93 (noting from 1976 to 2010 minor league
minimum has gone from $4,375 to $7,375 while major league minimum has gone
from $16,000 to $400,000).
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to their detriment.125  Generally, however, CBA negotiations nega-
tively impacted minor league players.126
When the National League expanded by adding the Colorado
Rockies and Florida Marlins in 1993, provisions put in place in the
1990 Agreement established the procedures for the expansion
draft.127  The Agreement held that all minor league players who
were not eligible for the next Rule 5 Draft were not eligible for the
expansion draft.128  Thus, a significant amount of minor league
players were excluded from the possibility of entering the expan-
sion draft for an opportunity play on a new major league expansion
team.129  In 1994-1995, due to the ongoing strike by major league
players, some minor league players responded to offers by owners
to serve as replacement players.130  The strike ended during Spring
Training in 1995 and, for the rest of their careers, those minor
league players who took the opportunity to play in the major league
as replacements were viewed as “scabs.”131
More recently, CBA negotiations led to decisions that have had
a direct negative effect on minor league players.132  The 2007 Basic
Agreement shortened the signing period for players drafted in the
125. See id. at 82 (discussing MLBPA successfully preventing contraction of
two major league teams in 2001 which would have cost two farm-systems’ worth of
minor league players their jobs).
126. For a further discussion of specific instances in recent CBA negotiations
in which minor league players have been detrimentally affected, see infra notes
127-36 and accompanying text.
127. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 77 (detailing process in which each team
could submit list of fifteen major or minor league players to be protected from
expansion draft).
128. See id. (explaining Rule 5 Draft as annual draft, which allows other teams
to select minor league player if that player is not yet on major league roster and
has played requisite amount of years in minor leagues).
129. See id. at 78 (noting that if player was drafted in expansion draft he was
automatically placed on expansion club’s major league roster).
130. See id. at 81 (discussing how some owners coerced minor league players
into signing up as replacements by either offering them money or threatening to
end their contracts).  For players who had toiled in the minor leagues for years,
this seemed like a golden opportunity to realize their dream and play in the major
league. See id. (acknowledging it was also difficult to turn down salary of $115,000
offered to replacement players considering how little they made in minors).
131. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 81 (stating MLBPA’s policy that once
former replacement player made major league roster they were still barred for rest
of their careers from union’s representation).  Given that the strike ended before
the season started, some of the players that took the risk and played as replace-
ment players saw only a couple of measly at-bats in spring training games before
they were fired. See id. (noting most were given small amount of severance pay,
between $2,000 and $5,000, while Montreal Expos only gave their discarded re-
placement players signed jerseys).
132. For a discussion on the affects of the latest CBA negotiations, see infra
133-37 and accompanying text.
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Rule 4 Draft and pushed back the eligibility requirements for the
Rule 5 Draft by a year.133  These changes limited minor league
player mobility and decreased potential opportunities to be signed
to a major league contract.134  Moreover, the 2012 Basic Agreement
severely limited the amount an amateur can earn through a signing
bonus and eliminated the ability of amateurs to negotiate their mi-
nor league contracts before officially playing in the minor
leagues.135  Thus, the precedent set by the 1968 Agreement in bar-
gaining over matters that affect minor league players continues to-
day.136  This history leads to the current case of Senne v. Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball, in which the court must decide if the ex-
ploitation of minor league players has gone too far.137
133. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 84-85 (explaining how shortened signing
period for draftees of Rule 4 Draft limits players’ ability to negotiate contract terms
while extension of Rule 5 Draft eligibility allows major league teams to delay sign-
ing players another year before another team can acquire those players in Rule 5
Draft).  The Rule 4 Amateur Draft is the standard draft in which amateurs enter,
are drafted by a major league team, and are assigned to a minor league affiliate in
that team’s farm-system. See id. (differentiating from Rule 5 Draft, which essen-
tially re-drafts minor league players who have been in minor leagues for several
seasons without being signed to major league team).
134. See id. at 85-86 (telling story of former minor leaguer Mark Alexander
and damaging effects rule changes had on his career).  Mark Alexander pitched
very well in the Dodgers’ farm system for three years and – given that he was then
eligible for the Rule 5 draft due to his three years of service – was hoping that the
Dodgers would either protect him by signing him to their forty-man roster or that
he would be picked up by another team in the Rule 5 Draft which would guarantee
him a spot on that team’s twenty-five-man major league roster. See id. (listing array
of pitching awards Alexander won at different minor league levels).  Although, the
2007 CBA pushed back eligibility for Rule 5 Draft to four years service time, which
in turn allowed the Dodgers to wait another year before they had to decide if they
wanted to protect Alexander by reserving him on the forty-man roster. See id. (ex-
plaining Alexander did not pitch well following year, was not picked up in next
Rule 5 Draft, and retired from baseball without ever playing in MLB).
135. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 87-90 (discussing newly established aggre-
gated bonus pools).  Under this new system, each team is granted a specific
amount of money that can be used towards signing bonuses and those teams ex-
ceeding the limit must pay a harsh tax—a team that exceeds its bonus pool by 5%-
10% must pay a 75% tax on the overage as well as losing a first round draft pick in
the following draft. See id. (noting penalty tax distributed evenly among teams that
stay within bonus pool).  Also, the restriction of amateurs only being able to sign
minor league contracts prevents the opportunity for a top-talent prospect – while a
rare occurrence – to sign a major league contract right away. See id. (discussing
players such as Stephen Strasburg who signed major league contract as amateur
and benefited right away by being on 40-man roster and earning significantly more
money while playing in minor leagues).
136. See generally Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm.,
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting recent court decision reiterat-
ing MLBPA only represents major league players).
137. For a further discussion of issues in Senne, see infra notes 138-52 and
accompanying text.
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C. The Case of Senne
1. Background of Senne
The plaintiffs in Senne, a group of former minor leaguers rep-
resenting all thirty MLB franchises, contend their lack of union rep-
resentation enabled the MLB to illegally depress their wages
without providing them with any recourse.138  Thus, because the
MLB controls entry into the League, plaintiffs argue that the MLB
exploits young players’ desire to make a major league team by
grossly underpaying them.139  Considering consistencies at each mi-
nor league level, plaintiffs believe the MLB and Commissioner issue
guidelines as to how much a player will make upon signing his ini-
tial UPC contract.140  Currently, entry-level wages for a first-year
player are $1,100 per month.141  A player is only entitled to receive
his monthly salary during the championship season, which, at its
longest, is five months.142  Thus, minor leaguers are not paid for
any of the work they are required by contract to perform outside of
their regular season and playoff games, such as spring training, win-
ter workouts, and instructional leagues.143  Due to the limited num-
ber of months in which players can receive a paycheck, plaintiffs
estimate the majority of minor league players earn less than $7,500
annually.144  Therefore, given their annual income, minor league
baseball players fall well below the federal poverty guidelines.145
Plaintiffs further contend that, in addition to not being paid
for work performed outside the championship season, players are
not paid for a large amount of work performed during their cham-
138. For a further discussion on MLBPA and its lack of application to minor
leaguers, see supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
139. See Complaint Senne, supra note 6, para. 95 (claiming MLB exploits mi-
nor leaguers by paying them below minimum wage or not paying them at all).
140. See id. para. 96 (noting teams deviate very little from these guidelines).
141. See id. para. 98 (listing monthly salaries at each level – $1,100 for Rookie
and Short-Season A; $1,250 for Class-A; $1,500 for Class-AA; and $2,150 for Class-
AAA).
142. See id. para. 101 (constituting Championship Season from start of playing
regular season games to end of playing season when they are eliminated from play-
offs, if they even made it).
143. See id. paras. 102-07 (describing all obligations under their contracts that
players are required to perform in off-season yet must do so without being paid).
144. See id. para. 101 (noting players at lower levels earn $3,000 or less be-
cause their season is shorter).
145. See U.S. Federal Poverty Measure, 2015 Federal Poverty Guidelines, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/15
poverty.cfm#guidelines (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (establishing federal poverty
threshold for forty-eight contiguous states at $11,770).
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pionship season.146  Plaintiffs state that during the season minor
league teams, on average, play six to seven games a week, with each
day at the stadium demanding eight hours of the players’ time.147
Strength trainers hired by the MLB franchises demand additional
time from players for mandatory conditioning.148  Furthermore,
plaintiffs allege that the amount of travel time on busses during
road trips adds considerable time to their workweek.149  On top of
that, plaintiffs claim that it takes a significant amount of time to
pack and unpack for each trip.150  Consequently, plaintiffs demand
compensation for the significant overtime hours they believe they
log each week.151  Thus, plaintiffs seek to recoup damages against
the MLB for paying them below minimum wage, failing to pay them
overtime, and failing to pay them at all for a substantial amount of
work performed.152
2. Claims in Senne
Plaintiffs and the Minor League Collective filed claims against
Major League Baseball, the Commissioner, and all thirty MLB
teams.153  Plaintiffs allege wage and hour violations under both fed-
eral and state law.154  This Comment focuses specifically on the fed-
eral claims.155
Count I contends that Defendants have been, and continue to
be, in violation of federal minimum wage and overtime require-
ments established by the FLSA.156  Plaintiffs state that at all relevant
146. See Complaint Senne, supra note 6, paras. 109-21 (alleging minor leaguers
work well in excess of forty hours per week considering everything they are re-
quired to do).
147. See id. para. 110 (estimating three hours per game plus five hours total
before and after for mandatory stretching, batting practice, fielding practice,
throwing, and conditioning).
148. See id. para. 112 (stating required workouts under MLB’s UPC add addi-
tional compensable time to total number of hours they work per week).
149. See id. para. 113 (noting half of team’s games are played away from home
with road trips entailing multiple bus rides lasting several hours).
150. See id. para. 114 (describing how players must pack all of their equip-
ment and load it onto bus only to have process reversed when they get back).
151. See id. para. 116 (stating minor leaguers work roughly 60-70 hours per
week and thus deserve overtime pay for 20-30 hours per week).
152. See Complaint, Senne, supra note 6, para. 66 (citing collective damages
sought by plaintiffs through class action).
153. See id. para. 172 (indicating all similarly-situated minor league players are
entitled to collectively participate in action by “opting-in”).
154. See id. paras. 176-270 (bringing state claims under California, Florida,
Arizona, North Carolina, and New York laws)
155. See id. paras. 163-75 (alleging 2 claims under FLSA).
156. See id. para. 164 (declaring defendants engaged in long-standing and
widespread violations of FLSA).
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times, they were, or continue to be, employees within the meaning
of the FLSA.157  Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, at all rel-
evant times, served as employers under the standards of the
FLSA.158  Plaintiffs state their claim is further validated by the fact
that their work regularly involves interstate commerce.159  There-
fore, given these facts, as alleged, Plaintiffs contend Defendants
“constructed, implemented, and engaged in a policy and practice”
that failed/fails to pay minor league players minimum wage, failed/
fails to pay them overtime, and failed/fails to pay them at all for
much of the work they perform.160  Plaintiffs allege Defendant
knowingly committed these violations in a reckless manner.161
Next, Count II alleges Defendants have not properly kept
records in compliance with the FLSA.162  Plaintiffs claim Defend-
ants failed to account for all of the extra hours minor league play-
ers work, as detailed above.163  Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that there
is a presumption that the employees’ estimates of hours worked are
accurate, because Defendants failed to keep proper records.164  As
a result of the violations in Count I and II, Plaintiffs state they have
suffered and continue to suffer damages and, thus, are entitled to
157. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2011) (defining employee under FLSA).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2011) (defining employer as person acting directly
or indirectly in interest of employer in relation to employee).
159. See Complaint, Senne, supra note 6, para. 165 (implying claimant’s stand-
ing under FLSA).
160. See id. paras. 167-69 (listing 3 claims under FLSA Defendants are in viola-
tions of).
161. See id. para. 171 (claiming Defendants pattern of unlawful practices have
been willful and defendants knew or should have known such practices were
unlawful).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2011) (directing that every employer must keep
records of employees in regard to wages, hours, and other conditions and em-
ployer must preserve such records).
163. See Complaint, Senne, supra note 6, para.  174 (claiming Defendants
failed and continue to fail to properly record hours minor leaguers work in
workweek).
164. See id. para. 175 (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clements Pottery Co., 328 U.S.
680, 687-88 (1946)).  In Anderson, the Court held that under the FLSA an employer
is required to keep proper records of wages, hours, and other conditions and if
there is a violation and the employer has not kept proper records, an employee is
entitled to damages if they can prove “that he has in fact worked for which he was
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the
amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” See
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687-88 (clarifying employer still capable of rebutting em-
ployee claims with its own evidence).
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relief under FLSA.165  The case is currently pending in Federal Dis-
trict Court in Northern District of California.166
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION IN SENNE
A. Victory Unlikely for Minor Leaguers
Despite the different ways in which minor league players have
sought relief, their chances of winning—not only in Senne, but in
general—are slim.167  In Senne Plaintiffs are seeking relief under
FLSA.168  However, despite apparent inequalities between major
league players and minor league players, it is unlikely that the MLB
or MLBPA is in violation of any federal labor laws.169  The exploita-
tion of minor league players as a bargaining chip in CBA negotia-
tions is not necessarily illegal, because every decision affecting
minor league players affects major league players in some way as
well.170  Therefore, given how courts have interpreted CBAs to ex-
clude minor league players from MLBPA representation, it is un-
likely that the court will find the use of minor league players as a
bargaining chip to be invalid.171
It is unclear how the court will rule regarding whether or not
minor league baseball employers are exempt from the FLSA.172  In
165. See Complaint Senne, supra note 6, para. 170 (claiming all damages recov-
erable pursuant to FLSA).  “Any employer who violates the provisions . . . of this
title shall be liable to the employee or the employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (2011) (outlining damages, right of action, attorney’s fees and costs, and
termination of right of cost for violation of minimum wage or overtime compensa-
tion law).
166. See generally Second Amended Complaint Senne, supra note 13 (reporting
suit has been filed in circuit court in San Francisco).
167. For a further discussion on likelihood that minor leaguers will not be
afforded the relief they desire, see infra 168-82 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Complaint Senne, supra note 6 (bringing claims under FLSA).
169. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 94 (acknowledging MLB has never recog-
nized MLBPA as bargaining representative for minor leaguers therefore MLBPA
owes no duty to minor league players and cannot be in violation of federal laws).
170. See id. at 95 (discussing how bargaining over draft matters affects major
league free agency as well as minor league players’ mobility).  Although, on the
whole, minor leaguers are negatively affected—as demonstrated by the institution
of signing bonus pools that, if exceeded, require a team to pay a penalty tax which
is then distributed among other clubs to help pay those clubs’ major league play-
ers’ salaries. See id. at 90 (noting signing bonuses of minor leaguers are limited
while major leaguers salaries are paid by violations of bonus pool limitation).
171. See id. at 94 (noting every basic agreement since 1970 states MLBPA is
“sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all Major League Players”).
172. For further background on recent FLSA challenges against MLB and in-
consistencies in court rulings, see sources cited and accompanying text supra notes
74-92.
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response to FLSA claims against the Cincinnati Reds, the court in
Bridewell held that the team does not fit the seasonal establishment
exemption and thus is subject to the FLSA.173  In contrast, and pos-
sibly more in line with the circumstances in Senne, the court in Jeffery
found that a minor league team was a seasonal establishment and
thus exempt from the FLSA.174  Therefore, while it is undecided as
to how minor league players will be treated under the FLSA, the
most relevant court precedent works against them.175  Even if the
court finds that minor league teams are not exempt as seasonal es-
tablishments, the Defendants can argue that minor league players
are exempt as “creative professional employees.”176  The MLB
could raise the point that the overtime pay the minor leaguers de-
mand is not for work, but rather for their own professional develop-
ment.177  In other words, minor league players who train and hone
their craft outside of the games do not deserve overtime pay for
attempting to improve their own professional ability.178
Furthermore, given the combination of the MLB’s antitrust ex-
emption and the traditional view of the minor league journey, Con-
gress does not appear to be drafting favorable legislation for minor
league players any time soon.179  In 1998 Congress passed the Curt
173. See generally Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that despite length of season Reds are year-round organization subject to
FLSA).
174. See generally Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d. 590 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding given length of minor league team’s season, at less than seven months,
club was seasonal establishment exempt from FLSA).
175. See id. (employers of minor league team not regulated by FLSA).
176. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EXEMPTION FOR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), U.S. WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION
(July 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/fairpay/
fs17a_overview.pdf  (recognizing exemption from FLSA for employees who per-
form work requiring originality or talent in recognized field or creative endeavor).
177. See McCann, supra note 17 (discussing life of professional athlete de-
mands long hours and tough schedule which do no equate to work requiring over-
time pay).
178. See id. (noting baseball will cite case precedent and Department of Labor
Wage and Hour materials in supporting their argument).  When an employee
qualifies as a “bona fide professional employee” they become exempt under Sec-
tion 213(a)(1) of the FLSA and an employer is not required to pay them overtime
for work in which they utilize their talent. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2011) (quali-
fying creative professional employee as one whose primary duty is performance of
work requiring invention, imagination, originality or talent in recognized field of
creative endeavor).
179. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 96 (citing Supreme Court cases repeat-
edly recognizing Congress’s ability to eliminate antitrust exemption yet failure of
any legislation to ever do so).
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Flood Act, weakening baseball’s antitrust exemption.180  However,
this act specifically held that baseball retained its exemption from
antitrust laws concerning matters related to minor league play-
ers.181  Considering Congress’s refusal to enact changes in baseball
for minor league players, along with the traditional notions of the
requisite journey to the major leagues, efforts by minor league play-
ers to lobby for change appears futile.182
B. Assuming Arguendo Minor League Players Win
A win for the minor league players in this case would not only
have huge implications in baseball but would ignite suits in other
organizations, thereby reshaping professional sports.183  If the court
finds that minor league players are employees under the FLSA, the
players are entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay.184  Re-
cently, the NLRB ruled that Northwestern University football play-
ers are employees within the meaning of federal labor laws.185
Thus, if Northwestern football players brought a claim under the
FLSA, they could argue that they are employees under labor law
and are entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay.186
180. 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (1998), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/us-
code/text/15/26b%5C (stating antitrust laws are to apply to matters effecting em-
ployment of major league baseball players).
181. See id. (stating Act does not apply to anything in relation to minor league
players or first-year player draft).
182. See Broshuis, supra note 102, at 98 (discussing failed attempts at passing
bills and little power minor league players have in influencing any substantial
change).  In 2001, Congress rejected a bill proposed by Minnesota Senator Paul
Wellstone, the Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports Act, which attempted to
amend language of the Curt Flood Act. See id. (arguing Congress has given MLB
team owners blank check of power by refusing to change exemption).
183. For a further discussion of ramifications across all sports, see infra notes
184-90 and accompanying text.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2011) (explaining definitions of FLSA and require-
ments for being recognized as employee under statute).
185. See NLRB, NLRB DIRECTOR FOR REGION 13 ISSUES DECISION IN NORTH-
WESTERN UNIVERSITY ATHLETES CASE, NLRB.GOV (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.nlrb
.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-director-region-13-issues-decision-northwest-
ern-university-athletes (citing NLRB’s decision supporting NW football players as
“employees” under labor law allow to unionize).  The NLRB reasoned that “the
players time commitment to their sport and the fact that their scholarships were
tied directly to their performance on the field” brought them within wide scope of
the common law definition of “employee” used in the National Labor Relations
Act. See Brian Bennett, Northwestern Players Get Union Vote, ESPN (Mar. 27, 2014,
9:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10677763/northwest-
ern-wildcats-football-players-win-bid-unionize (highlighting other lawsuits and scru-
tiny of NCAA over its amateurism rules).
186. See Zachary R. Fowler & Nicole J. O’Hara, Student Athletes Could be FLSA
Pitfall for Colleges, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 2014, available at http://www
.evergreeneditions.com/article/Student-Athletes+Could+Be+FLSA+Pitfall+For+
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College football programs generate massive, yearly revenues
for their respective universities, dwarfing even the most successful
minor league teams’ intake.187  Hence, college football programs
are generating more than enough money to compensate their play-
ers at the national minimum.188  Therefore, if the court in Senne
allows minor league players to share in the revenue, college football
players will have a very strong case in demanding a portion of the
revenue they produce as well.189  While the weight of this issue is
outside the scope of this Comment, it is important to realize that a
decision in favor of minor league players could have a domino ef-
fect through college sports.190
A win for the minor league players would also have a signifi-
cant economic effect on professional baseball.191  Most importantly,
increased salaries for minor leaguers would directly cause minor
league teams in the smaller markets to fold.192  Attendees of minor
league games are drawn to the fun, family atmosphere of the
game.193  They enjoy the idea of cheap tickets, fun promotions, and
wholesome entertainment while watching quality baseball.194  Thus,
increases in price would only serve to deter those trying to watch a
game for a reasonable cost.195  Therefore, while a win for minor
Colleges/1740158/0/article.html (discussing while scholarship athletes are com-
pensated in form of scholarships non-scholarship athletes are working without
compensation).
187. See id. (noting in 2013 University of Texas football team generated $139
million in revenue including $34.5 million in ticket sales alone).
188. See id. (discussing original intent of FLSA was to promote minimum stan-
dard of living necessary for health and well-being of workers).
189. See Alicia Jessop, The Economics of College Football: A Look at the Top-25
Team’s Revenues and Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football-a-look-at-
the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/ (listing total revenues of top NCAA
teams with twenty-fifth ranked Oregon State at bottom bringing in $20.7 million in
annual revenue).
190. See Fowler & O’Hara, supra note 186 (discussing recognition of college
players as employees could give rise not only to FLSA claims but to claims for
workers’ compensation and employment discrimination as well).
191. See McCann, supra note 17 (discussing economic arguments MLB will
likely raise in Senne case).
192. See id. (noting increase in pay and benefits would translate into higher
ticket prices for minor league games, which fans would not pay).
193. See Top Ten Minor League Baseball Promotions, REAL CLEAR SPORTS (May 17,
2013), http://www.realclearsports.com/lists/top_10_minor_league_promotions/
intro.html (discussing various ways minor league teams lure fans to stadium such
as “Nickel Beer Night”).
194. See id. (noting fans allure to all-you-can-eat deals and package deals for
families).
195. See Ken Davidoff, High Costs of Citi Visits Helping to Keep Mets Fans Away,
N.Y. POST, Apr. 5, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/04/05/high-cost-of-citi-visits-
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league players may enhance their current situation, many will lose
their jobs because the overall minor league system would face ex-
treme economic pressure.196
V. CONCLUSION
A win for minor leaguers in Senne could potentially change the
face of sports, both at the professional and amateur level, for-
ever.197  If deemed employees within the scope of the FLSA, the
MLB would have to compensate both former and current minor
league players for every hour they ever worked, as well as all of the
unpaid overtime hours they logged.198  A decision awarding these
damages is extremely unlikely.199  However, regardless of Senne’s
outcome, by peeling away the romantic outer layer of minor league
baseball and showing the world its impoverished core, the MLB will
be driven to institute change in a way that will benefit minor league
players.200  Be it in the form of increased wages or CBA regulations
limiting use of minor league players as a bargaining chip, minor
league players must be reasonably able to follow their dreams.201
Thus, while the minor league players in Senne may not win, they
have opened the door, and sooner or later, change will arrive.202
Mark Stanton*
helping-to-keep-mets-fans-away/ (discussing high cost to experience Mets games
and lack of tickets being sold).
196. For a further discussion of economic pressures forcing minor league
teams to fold, see supra 191-95 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion on the ramifications of a win for minor leaguers, see
supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion on plaintiffs’ claims and demands, see supra notes 153-
66 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of likelihood of victory for minor leaguers, see supra
notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
200. For a further discussion on salaries falling below federal poverty level,
see supra notes 144-45.
201. For a brief discussion on the tough road to the major leagues, see supra
notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
202. For a further discussion on likelihood of victory for minor leaguers, see
supra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; Denison Uni-
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the Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal for their hard work and commitment to
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like to thank Abner Doubleday for giving us the gift of baseball.
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